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The Round-Trip Fallacy 




In this essay I will explain the concept of the Round-Trip Fallacy and 
show that it is a distinct reasoning mistake. The round-trip fallacy involves 
inferring from the absence of evidence of an event the conclusion that there is 
evidence for the absence of this event. I claim that this is a widely committed 
and potentially hazardous mistake. First, I present Nicholas Taleb's original 
account of the round-trip fallacy (Taleb 2007). Then, I will develop this fallacy 
in such a way that it can be used as a precise tool for analysing reasoning 
mistakes, thereby going beyond Taleb's original formulation. I argue my account
of the fallacy is distinct from Taleb's in important ways. Lastly I show how a 
mistake in scientific reasoning exemplifies the fallacy and I will offer a proposal
for countering such shortcomings in the research process. The contribution of 
this work is a more precise definition of the round-trip fallacy. I think the limits 
of our reasoning-capacity become clearer through this inquiry into failed 
reasoning. 
Fallacious reasoning in general 
In its ideal form, reasoning can be characterized as abiding by certain 
constraints from logic, e.g. truth- preservation (Stenning and Van Lambalgen, 
2008), updating hypotheses in light of evidence (Bradley, 2015), and neutrality 
with respect to non-epistemic values (see Bueter, 2015 for a discussion). On a 
methodological level, Popper’s falsificationism, Lakatos’ research programs 
(Lakatos 1970), Kuhn’s concerns with the scientific community and other 
notions influence the ideal of scientific reasoning significantly (Mulkay and 
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Gilbert, 1981). 
While these norms are part of ideal scientific reasoning, real reasoning 
diverges in systematic ways from this archetype. Reasons for this divergence lie 
within the limits of our cognitive capacities and a preference for fast and 
effortless processing. Loosely defined, a fallacy is a characteristic failure in reasoning 
(“Fallacy” (n.d.) §1.1), characteristic because the same mistakes occur in similar 
situations. A further aspect of fallacies is that the reasoning seems valid for the one 
committing the fallacy and other reasoners tricked by the fallacy (Walton, 1999).
We can use fallacies to explain mistakes in reasoning. Consider the 
fallacy of affirming of the consequent (Geis and Zwicky, 1972). Imagine 
somebody says that she smoked cigarettes for the last thirty years and was 
diagnosed with lung-cancer recently. Of course, you know that smoking may 
cause lung-cancer. It seems obvious that her smoking caused the lung-cancer. 
Yet this is not necessarily true. Maybe she tells you in the next sentence that she 
worked in an asbestos-factory in the same period of time, also a very likely 
cause of lung-cancer (Uguen et al., 2017). The conclusion that smoking caused 
the cancer seems valid yet the truth of the consequent (the occurrence of cancer) 
does not imply the truth of the antecedent (smoking cigarettes as a cause) and 
concluding that the antecedent is true is not warranted by the accessible 
information (Geis and Zwicky, 1972). Explicating the fallacy in this way makes 
evident that the judgement is logically invalid; fallacies can help explain 
mistakes in reasoning. Furthermore, such errors are more likely in similar 
situations. This can be helpful for building structures that counterbalance 
predictable non-ideal performance. The analysis of the round-trip fallacy is 
similarly useful for correcting reasoning. 
The round-trip fallacy as described by Taleb 
Nicholas Nassim Taleb identifies a reasoning mistake in his book The 
Black Swan that he calls the Round- Trip Fallacy (Taleb, 2007). Taleb’s 
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description of the fallacy is brief; he explains his idea by giving examples of the 
fallacy. I will try to refine his idea in more precise terms in the course of this 
essay. He asks us to imagine someone who, having observed a limited set of data
which does not include any surprising, impactful event, “would tell you, and 
rightly so, that there is no evidence of the possibility of large [impactful] events 
(Taleb, 2007) (italics in original).” The mistake in reasoning is:
You are likely to confuse that statement, however, particularly if 
you do not pay close attention, with the statement that there is 
evidence of no possible [surprising and impactful events]. Even 
though it is in fact vast, the logical distance between the two 
assertions will seem very narrow in your mind, so that one can be 
easily substituted for the other. I call this confusion the round-trip 
fallacy, since these statements are not interchangeable (Taleb, 
2007). 
Note that Taleb's reference to evidence of “no possible” events is likely 
an unintended error. The examples Taleb gives to illustrate the round trip fallacy do
not refer to “impossibility” or imply that the unobserved event is “impossible.” If a 
patient receives a negative result for a cancer-screening, the doctor may  infer – 
mistakenly – that there is evidence of the absence of cancer in the patient’s tissue – thus 
the round-trip fallacy – but it is hardly likely that the doctor would infer that it is 
impossible for the patient to have cancer. After all, cancer is still conceivable, the 
screening doesn't show it is an analytical truth that the patient is cancer-free. 
Refining the account 
Although Taleb’s description sparks interest, it lacks precision. Taleb’s 
description of the fallacy stays on an intuitive level and does not make explicit why the 
fallacy is a fallacy in the first place. The reader of his account therefore left with the 
intuition that “something seems wrong” about the described reasoning and may feel a 
sense of unease. We need to explain the idea that “these two statements are not 
interchangeable (Taleb, 2007).” Statistical terminology lends itself well to this task since 
the core of the fallacious reasoning is an unjustified inductive inference. Three main 
elements of the round-trip fallacy can be derived from Taleb's account in The Black 
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Swan: 
There is absence of evidence of a particular event x. 
There is evidence of absence of this particular event x. 
Absence of evidence of x → evidence of absence of x. 
Consider a draw of observations from a set which may contain a 
particular event x. Let's assume there is a chance bigger than zero that you do 
not observe x in your draw. The first statement says you do not have evidence 
that x is in the set, since you have not observed it and the second statement 
means that one may be able to rule out the observation of event x in the set of 
events. The third element of the round-trip fallacy expresses the conflation of the
general claim with the observational statement. This conflation of observation 
with the general claim is decisive. Someone observes absence of event x, 
believes that this implies that this is evidence for no event x and draws the 
conclusion that there is evidence for the absence of x. Now the question arises 
whether this belief, that the one statement can be inferred from the other, is 
justified. That is, can “no evidence of x” be exchanged with “evidence of no x”? 
If the second statement was entailed by the first, the inference to the second 
statement would be warranted. This is a decisive question that Taleb skips over. 
Moreover, he fails to delineate when the inference is justified and when it is not. 
He mentions that there is a vast logical distance between the two 
statements though they may seem close to each other – the warrant for inferring 
from the first to the second statement is weak. “Evidence of no x” is not entailed
by “no evidence of x,” that is, there is no valid deductive inference from one to 
the other statement. Additionally, one may make an inductive inference from 
“no evidence of x” to “evidence of no x” but it comes with high inductive 
uncertainty, and whatever basis it has depends on what set of events we draw the
observations from. A toy example may help illustrate the point. Take an 
idealized draw from an urn which either contains 100 balls of all the same color 
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(e.g. 100 blue balls) or of two different colors equally distributed (e.g. 50 blue 
and 50 red). You do know these two possibilities but not which set-up is the 
case. If you draw 49 blue balls, you observe “no evidence of red balls.” You 
cannot claim that you have evidence that there are no red balls yet it is very 
likely that there are only blue balls in the urn. Thus, the inductive inference to 
the claim there are only blue balls in the urn is well supported by the empirical 
evidence however it is not necessitated by it. In this example, the inferential 
basis for inferring from “no evidence of x” to “evidence of no x” is strong. Now 
suppose you observe 51 draws of blue balls and know the two possible set-ups 
of the urn, you could say with certainty that the urn only holds blue balls and 
that you have evidence of the absence of red balls. In this case the absence of 
red balls and the knowledge about the urn allows the inference that there are no 
red balls in the urn. Yet in the real world we usually do not have such 
information and more importantly, the assumed distributions from which such 
events are drawn are less idealized and more unpredictable. 
Surely, justified inductive inferences have to be distinguished from cases 
where the round-trip fallacy can arise. The fallacy can occur when the 
observations you are trying to generalize from are not representative enough to 
support the generalization. This can be the case when the number of 
observations on a set of events is too small relative to the size of the. Claiming 
that there are only blue balls in the urn after having observed 10 blue balls is 
misjudging the distance between these 10 observations and the claim that there 
is evidence for the generalization that there are only such balls. Furthermore, the
fallacy can occur when the events one observes do not follow a discernible 
pattern or cannot be assumed to be distributed amongst a Gaussian, uniform-
distribution, or any other such well-known statistical distribution. You can find 
yourself in such a situation when you don't know that the events do not (!) fit a 
Gaussian distribution or that there are many more possible observations. Also, 
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one might willfully disregard missing evidence or the lack of uniformness of 
events one is concerned with. In such cases, the difference between “absence of 
evidence of x” and “evidence of absence of x” is overlooked. 
From this discussion it may have become apparent that a critical cause of
the round-trip fallacy is poor understanding of statistics. A key claim of The 
Black Swan is that the social world we move around in is too often falsely 
perceived, by experts and lay-people alike, as containing regularities, e.g. 
following a Gaussian distribution, when in reality it is quite unpredictable and 
volatile (Taleb, 2007). Thus, even though my account of the round-trip fallacy 
goes well beyond Taleb’s initial formulation, it still stays true to his general 
claim. The round-trip fallacy is one manifestation of how mischaracterization 
and oversimplification of our reality arises out of a misconception of statistical 
representativeness and likelihood-distributions. An integral aspect of fallacies is 
that those who commit the fallacy are not aware of the mistake and the drawn 
inference appears valid (Walton, 1999). This aspect seems to be present in the 
round-trip fallacy since the misconception of the distance between the two 
central statements makes the inference seem valid.
In sum, then, the round-trip fallacy is committed when one makes a 
mistaken inductive inference from the absence of evidence of x to the 
conclusion that there is evidence of the absence of x. I have described how this 
fallacy arises and what statistical notions it is based upon. It may seem as if the 
round-trip fallacy is just a variant of other types of fallacious generalization. I 
will consider this possibility in the next section. 
Examples of reasoning mistakes through the round-trip fallacy 
The pervasiveness of the round-trip fallacy can be seen in diverse 
examples. I will look at examples from science, medical practice and reasoning 
in the financial sector. A scientific example is the search for extraterrestrial life. 
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Projects such as the Voyager program, the Hubble Space Telescope and other 
international space programs yield much information about the make-up of other
solar-systems (Swain et al., 2008). So far, no evidence for extraterrestrial life has
been found through these programs. To conclude that this is evidence of the 
absence of extraterrestrial life would be an instance of the round-trip fallacy. 
Especially since space is vast and only a fraction of it was ever observed, the 
logical distance between “no evidence of extraterrestrial life” and “evidence of 
no extraterrestrial life” is vast and inferring the second from the first statement is
not supported by the premise. Here it may seem unlikely that one would commit
the round-trip fallacy since the logical distance between the two statements is 
quite apparent and the inferential basis for such an inference is obviously weak. 
In the next example this distance is subtler. In order to assess whether a patient 
has cancer or not, a sample of tissue is usually taken to be tested for cancerous 
cells. The doctor attempts to take a sample as representative as possible. If the 
test is negative, the doctor did not observe evidence for cancer. If she claims, 
based on the negative test and without considering further tests, that she has 
evidence that the patient does not have cancer, she is committing the round-trip 
fallacy (Taleb, 2007). The absence of cancerous cells is not proof that there is no
cancer in the body. Yet at first glance this may seem as a valid medical 
assessment. The third example shows that the round-trip fallacy is commonly 
committed, even by experts. An example from economics is the financial crash 
associated with the dot-com bubble burst. If you look at the stock market-
valuation of internet and technology companies in the U.S.A. between 1995 and 
March 2000, you would see a steady increase in their value and “no evidence of 
a crash.” One might draw the inference that this is “evidence of no crash” for the
future. But that would show overconfidence in the resilience of the stock-
market, falsely based on the reassuring good performance of the last few years. 
Such reasoning is an instance of the round-trip fallacy because the distance 
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between “no evidence of a crash” and “evidence of no crash” is vast logically. 
Furthermore, the burst of the bubble on March 10, 2000 shows that drawing this 
inference can have dire consequences. The 2008 financial crisis, caused by a 
mortage-bubble, the “Great Crash” of 1929 and other such crashes show that 
this is a reoccurring phenomenon (Ferguson, 2008). In part this is due to the fact 
that investors look at the absence of a crash in the last years and the rising 
performance of their shares and then reason to the conclusion that the market 
will continue to develop like this in the future or at least for now. Yet they miss 
the fact that their observation alone does not warrant this inference. The round-
trip fallacy can be found in the reasoning of doctors, investors and lay-people 
alike and does not seem restricted to a particular domain of reasoning. 
These examples show that the round-trip fallacy can arise in a variety of 
situations, sciences and with varying impact. I will now give a more in-depth 
account of research on lead-poisoning to show that scientists committed the 
round-trip fallacy when searching for the dose-effect relation for lead. Lead is a 
highly toxic heavy metal affecting virtually all organs and especially the 
developing nervous system (Mushak, 2011). Thus, it is important to know the 
relation of lead-dosage to health risk for children. Scientists and policy makers 
are interested in finding out the threshold of lead concentration above which 
negative health effects can be observed. 
Observational studies and case studies of children exposed to lead in 
their environment accumulated between 1920 and 1940 (Rabin, 1989). The 
studied toddlers and young infants ingested the lead paint of their cribs, toys and
children’s rooms and suffered from severe symptoms of Plumbism such as 
vomiting, abdominal pain, irritation, anemia, lack of muscular coordination, 
peripheral motor paralysis, etc. (Byers and Lord, 1943). The mounting evidence 
led the American Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to issue a 
policy statement which categorized blood lead levels above 60 μg/dL as 
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requiring medical intervention (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(2005)). This threshold was subsequently lowered in light of more accurate 
testing to a level of 10 μg/dL (ibid.). It may look like an example of good 
scientific practice resulting in vital policy decisions. Yet the scientific 
community seems to have missed more subtle effects of lead-poisoning 
(Lamphear, 2005). This failure is an example of the round-trip fallacy. The 
evidence that was considered by the scientists included children with visible 
symptoms of lead-poisoning but there were no subjects with low levels of lead 
in their blood since this does not cause the symptoms the scientists were 
screening for (Sciarillo et al., 1992). The fallacy plays out in the following way. 
First, the observation is made that there is no evidence that low levels of lead 
cause harm. Infer from that there is evidence low levels of lead do not cause 
harm. As a result of this wrong inference a threshold is postulated below which 
lead is not supposed to be harmful which is exactly what the CDC's guidelines 
did. For instance, Lamphear et al. (2005) found more subtle effects of low levels
of lead by analyzing effects on IQ measurements of subjects with lead-levels 
below 10 μg/dL. They did not find any “safe” level of lead when considering the
more elusive effects on intelligence. 
The occurrence of the fallacy is partly due to the sampling of the studies. 
Since the researchers included only subjects with certain physical symptoms, the
sample was not representative of all symptoms associated with lead exposure. 
The toxic effects of lead are multifarious, the investigating scientists came from 
different backgrounds and consequently the research lacked coordination 
(Mushak, 2011). This facilitated susceptibility to the round-trip fallacy. This 
example shows that the scientific community may commit the round-trip fallacy 
and that taking note of this mistake helps explaining the reasoning by the 
scientists. 
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A proposal to counter the round-trip fallacy 
The mistakes committed in the research might have been avoided if the 
scientific community had implemented the right procedures. I will consider a 
proposal by Hugh Lacey regarding approaches to hypotheses and whether his 
notion can counter the round-trip fallacy (Lacey, 2005). Holding, adopting and 
endorsing are three attitudes one can take to a theory (ibid.). I claim that 
researchers on Plumbism unjustifiably held the belief that there are low-levels of
lead without harm while they would have been more justified in seriously 
endorsing this belief. Holding a proposition means treating it as “belonging to 
the stock of established scientific knowledge (ibid.).” You are only justified in 
holding a proposition if all lines of research that could falsify the proposition 
have been exhaustively examined, that is, all objections have been answered. 
The scientists researching lead poisoning failed this test because they did not 
consider children with different, more subtle symptoms. If they had, they would 
have found an effect of lead-poisoning at levels below the assumed threshold. 
When the regulatory body, the CDC, issued a policy statement proposing this 
threshold, the claim that low levels of lead have no effect was held at that time 
but was unjustified. Lacey acknowledges that in some cases one must proceed 
even though not all aspects of a topic have been reviewed (ibid.). In that case, 
Endorsing the proposition is the correct attitude, that is, one should treat it “as 
being supported by evidence that is sufficiently strong that the legitimacy of 
courses of action [...] informed by it, should not be challenged on the ground 
that [the proposition] has insufficient empirical support (ibid.).” Furthermore, a 
proposition may be seriously endorsed only if it was based on inclusive 
research, that is research by scientists representing the different ethical and 
social values of a democratic society, and is tested against the strongest available
evidence. If the CDC had adopted the approach of seriously endorsing the 
threshold-claim, they might have added some cautionary remarks or qualifiers 
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such as “it is likely that below 10 μg/dL no harm should be expected.” The 
scientists would have looked for effects of lower levels earlier had the threshold 
not been set thus confidently. Lacey’s different approach could have countered 
the effects of the round-trip fallacy. Establishing resistance against holding or 
endorsing an idea can prevent mistaken reasoning. 
Conclusion 
In this essay I considered the role of fallacies for explaining reasoning-
processes. The round-trip fallacy was singled out as a distinct mistake in our 
reasoning. I took Taleb’s description of the reasoning mistake as a basis for 
precisely defining the fallacy as inferring the statement “there is evidence of no 
x.”from the statement “there is no evidence of x.” Contrary to appearances, this 
inference is not justified because the basis for moving from the first to the 
second statement is too weak in all but the most simplified cases, such as the 
example of drawing from an urn of red and blue balls as described earlier. The 
round-trip fallacy can occur in many different domains and especially in 
scientific inquiry. Within a well-structured scientific community, the results of 
the round-trip fallacy can be contained. I considered a proposal by Hugh Lacey 
for structuring scientific inquiry. If we understand the logical error at the core of 
the fallacy, we can learn how to adjust our institutions and environment to 
minimze the occurrence of this error. 
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